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TRANSITIONS IN MARKETING STRATEGY: A LOOK AT THE PROCESS
The concept of theories-in-use (knowledge structures we hold and update based
on experience) is used to explain how marketing organizations transition between
strategic styles in response to environmental shifts. The process is illustrated in the
case history of a bank trust department's responses to the deregulation of financial
markets in the early 1980' s. The paper suggests that to transition between strategic
types does not involve a controlled strategic adaptation process but requires instead
iterative changes to theories-in-use through enactment. It uses institutional and
resource dependence theories as frameworks that illustrate the trust department's
dominant theories-in-use before and after deregulation.
The paper begins with a description of a bank trust department prior to the
financial industry deregulation and a discussion of the dominant theory-in-use and its
strategic marketing consequences. It then describes the deregulation events and the
changes they forced on the trust department, as well as the theory-in-use most
appropriate to the new environment. The paper then summarizes two competing
explanations for how firms transition between strategic styles: classical strategic
adaptation theory and sense making through enactment. It shows enactment is a better
explanation of the process the trust department actually followed than classical
adaptation theory because it better reflects what we know about human response to new
environments. The paper concludes with some implications for strategic marketing
theory and management.

Introduction
Marketing strategy, recognized as an important field of inquiry a decade ago
(Anderson 1982) is today more important than ever before. The factors that made it
important at that time (e.g., global competition, deregulation, the speed of
technological advances, and pressures for productivity and quality) have become even
more prevalent and accentuated the need for strategic marketing. In the last decade,
strategic marketing has matured as a field of study and much has been learned about
operational, financial, and managerial factors critical to successful strategic marketing.
Much has also been learned about strategic management styles and the tools and
perspectives marketing managers need to navigate volatile environments, although as
always, there is much that remains to be understood. Of particular interest to this
discussion are the mental processes involved in strategic responses to environmental
changes. This paper takes a cognitive perspective on strategic marketing managers and
uses an ethnographic approach to illustrate how a business unit committed to strategic .
marketing actually changes its strategic style to fit a new environment.
The work on strategic marketing and strategic market planning is extensive. It
has addressed the need for categorization schemes or typologies (Segev 1989) on the
basis of industry factors (Porter 1985), performance characteristics (Buzzell and Gale
1987), and organizational orientation to the environment (Miles and Snow 1978). It
has also sought to meet the needs for management tools (e.g., Sheth and Frazier 1983,
Ziethaml and Ziethaml 1984) and organizational change (e.g., McDaniel and Kolari
1987) to achieve better strategy. Its primary objective has been to identify the factors
that are most important to a business' position in its industry or strategic segment (e.g.,
barriers to entry or exit, market attractiveness, technology) and to its ability to respond
to environmental change (e.g.,, synergy, beliefs, culture). In both areas the progress
has been considerable and resulted in a formal area of managerial training (e.g., Kerin,
Mahajan, and Varadarajan 1990).
Attention has also been focused on how marketing managers go about
developing and implementing marketing strategy. The choice of strategic objectives
and actions has been shown to be affected by a manager's beliefs about the market's
attractiveness, the company's strengths, and its ability to understand and shape the
environment (Burke 1984). Strategic initiatives have also been shown to be influenced
by the interaction patterns of key individuals and strategic groups (Hutt, Reingen, and
Ronchetto 1988). A behavioral orientation to understanding marketing strategic
thinking and practice was advocated by pioneers in the area (Day and Wensley 1983)
and remains an important perspective today (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). Of great
interest in today's turbulent environments is the need to understand how marketing
managers and their organizations transition from one strategic orientation to another in
order to better fit with the changing environment.
The need for shifting strategic orientation in response to environmental changes
has been discussed in marketing (McDaniel and Kolari 1987) and strategic management
(Zajac and Shortell 1989). Both sets of authors used the Miles and Snow (1978)
typology to better understand strategic marketing by business and changing
environments: McDaniel and Kolari looked at companies in the financial services
industry while Zajac and Shortell looked at health care providers.
Miles and Snow suggest that firms fall into four categories based on their
organizational/managerial orientation to the environment: defenders, prospectors,
analyzers, and reactors. Defenders see the environment as threatening but controllable.
They take a defensive position and set narrow and somewhat rigid parameters for their
product-market domains. Prospectors see the environment as promising and only
partially controllable. They take an opportunistic position, define their market domain
loosely, and redefine their strategies in response to emerging opportunities. Analyzers
fall between defenders and prospectors, seeing the environment as both dangerous and
promising. They often define some markets narrowly and defend them while
concurrently devoting resources to exploring partially defined opportunities outside
their main competencies. In some ways they adhere most to the growth/share matrix
axioms of harvesting cash cows and investing in question marks. Reactors lack
strategy and simply react to environmental and competitive forces. Their perspective
of the environment is confused and inconsistent, as are their strategic responses.
Whereas defender, analyzer, and prospector styles are all seen as viable by Miles and
Snow, the reactor style is considered detrimental and expected to result in poor
performance.
Both McDaniel and Kolari and Zajac and Shortell examined the strategic
marketing profiles of businesses for defenders, prospectors, and analyzers and found
that firms seeing themselves as prospectors and analyzers were similar in the
importance they gave to new product development, pricing strategy, and promotional
activities, and in this they were significantly different from the defenders. They
concluded prospectors and analyzers were better positioned for the deregulated
environment in their respective industries and business units in the financial services
and health care industries to transform themselves into prospectors and analyzers.
Other research (e.g., Hambrick 1983, Karnani 1984), some using Miles and Snow and
some using the Porter typology, has also shown that firms differ in their strategic
marketing practices and recommended firms should adopt strategic styles better suited
to the environment they face. Although it has been shown there is some relationship
between the Porter and Miles and Snow typologies (Segev 1989) and they have been
combined into even more detailed classification schemes (Boyd and Walker 1990),
these typologies differ in their fundamental focus (industry factors v. organizational
orientation) and showing that organizations transition between strategic styles using
both typologies is important. It shows the evidence for strategic transitions is not a
function of the perspective we take on the business unit or what factors we focus on.
Having recognized that strategic styles vary in how suitable they are to different
environments, we can extend our knowledge by considering how a business unit and its
management actually change strategic style; using our previous examples, how financial
and health care service providers transition from defenders to analyzers and
prospectors. Implied in many of the studies illustrating strategic transition is the idea
that once the differences between current strategic style and the environment are
highlighted, the need for change is clear and the way to implement self-evident.
Practice does not always support this view, however, since even in the face of crisis,
strategic change is difficult and often follows a circuitous and painful path (Mintzberg
and McHugh 1985). Part of the reason for difficult transitions is that business units
rely on managers to interpret and respond to the environment, and managers don't
always hold the same ideas or theories about how things work. Managers and
organizations learn slowly and through experience. They learn as current modes of
cognition are disconfirmed and new ones take their place (Gioia and Chitippeddi 1991).
Modes of cognition or knowledge structures have been the focus of considerable
research in strategic management (Walsh 1989) under names like dominant logic
(Prahalad and Bettis 1986), scripts (Gioia and Poole 1984, Gioia 1986), and theories-
in-use (Argyris and Schon 1974; Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring 1982). This
discussion will focus on theories-in-use as the term most adequate to the processes
being discussed.
Theories-in-use are implicit theories or frameworks that identify salient
variables, anticipate their relationships, and specify causal ordering. They have as an
underlying view of the world the positivist scientific model which characterizes much
of current marketing thinking and practice (Hirschman 1986). The theories-in-use of
marketing managers help them make sense of their situations and recognize what needs
to change, how to change, and in what direction change should lead. Theories-in-use
also act as filters of environmental information, however, by focusing attention on
some factors and causing others to be ignored. A theory-in-use incompatible with the
environment, therefore, can result in marketing strategy that is also incompatible and
the transition between strategic styles advocated by earlier research requires a different
orientation to the environment and by implication, changes to existing theories-in-use.
Understanding how theories-in-use change is therefore critical to our understanding of
how businesses transition between strategic styles.
Changes to theories-in-use and the transition between strategic styles in the
financial services industry is illustrated in the story of a Midwest bank's trust
department. The story takes place between 1981 and 1989 and follows the
department's transition from defender to analyzer. Data for this account was collected
from correspondence, personal interviews, and participation in the planning and
implementation of several strategic marketing initiatives. The study took seven years to
complete, two years (1982-1984) in action research and analysis of the events leading
up to the first attempts to transition in 1981, and five years (1985-1989) of periodic
follow-up.
The story has no heroes and few instances of proactive strategic marketing
management (Ziethaml and Ziethaml 1984). It abounds, however, in examples of how
theories-in-use were disconfirmed and adjusted, and their effect on marketing strategy.
The theories-in-use of the trust department management are often representative of
more formal theories of organization, although they are never as parsimonious or
conclusive. The labels of these formal theories help us explain the department's
progress, however, and will be used throughout the discussion. The story further
illustrates that transitions between strategic types is possible, but it is not a sequential
and carefully orchestrated process. The story takes place between 1981 and 1989, as
the trust department and the financial services industry as a whole tried to adjust to a
deregulated environment. The major environmental changes occurred between 1980
and 1982, although strategic marketing responses did not start being implemented until
1983 and some issues remained unresolved in 1989. The environmental changes and
strategic implications of these events are listed in Table 1 . The trust departments actual
responses to the changes are discussed below.
Insert Table 1 here
The Regulated Environment
From the depression until 1980 banks were regulated by federal and state law in
terms of interest rates they charged or paid, savings and checking instruments they
offered, and the types of investments they were allowed to make (consumers loans,
commercial loans, etc.). They were also restricted in their geographic markets. Our
bank, for example, could not have branches more than 25 miles from its home office.
The tight regulations limited competition and allowed community banks to be profitable
while limiting risk to individual depositors. In most small and medium sized
communities, commercial banks focused on meeting the savings and checking needs of
customers and small businesses. The needs of large business were met by larger banks
in major metropolitan areas (e.g., New York, San Francisco, etc.) The scope of
services, however, was identical to those of small banks. Small and large banks
benefited greatly from high deposit balances of wealthy customers, and established trust
departments to protect those deposits.
Trust departments prior to 1980 were primarily focused on serving the bank's
wealthy clientele. Although there was some variability between trust departments,
virtually all offered estate and financial planning, estate management, and financial
asset administration, services considered important by holders of accumulated wealth.
At our bank, the trust department's primary emphasis was in two areas: legal expertise
in estate and tax planning and professional administration of personal trusts and
employee benefit plans. Investment management was a secondary priority, and trust
investments were characteristically conservative. Portfolios were managed to protect
capital, yield modest returns, and assume minimal risk. Although this particular trust
department was sometimes praised locally for its legal expertise and had several
attorneys and CPA's on staff, it was only marginally different from the trust
departments of many other banks.
The financial accounting treatment of trust operations is another indicator of the
department's role in the bank's overall strategy. Quite often trust departments were
considered an expense area of the bank and folded into general overhead calculations.
Our trust department was no exception. The fees charged for trust services (on average
.5% of total assets under management) did not cover expenses. Trust operations were
subsidized by the commercial operations (loans, deposits, etc.) that benefited from
large margins on the transactions of wealthy trust clients. Margins are defined as the
spread between the cost of deposits (interest paid) and revenue from loans of the funds
(interest earned) an is a measure of gross profit in the banking industry.
In the regulated environment, there was little to differentiate the services of trust
departments, and customers chose a trust department based primarily on image criteria.
Bank trust departments consequently had to appear safe and legitimate to three
constituencies: the bank regulatory agencies that periodically audited trust operations,
trade associations, and the financial and legal advisors of the wealthy (attorneys,
CPA's, and insurance underwriters). Since legitimacy was important and direct
competitive forces were insignificant (trust departments from other geographic areas
were legally restricted in what they could offer), trust department managers relied on
external sources for direction in most marketing decisions - a good illustration of
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
The Institutional Theory-in-Use
and Marketing Strategy Implications
Institutional theory suggests organizations do not plan or try to affect their
environments, but merely respond to external influence, which the theory suggests
come from three sources: coercive, mimetic, and professional. Coercive influence is
exercised by entities that have legal authority, and for our trust department they were
federal and state regulatory agencies. Mimetic influence is exercised by organizations
in the same industry that are held as examples to be emulated, and took the form of
premier banks and trust companies frequently upheld as role models by trade
associations. Our trust department used the U.S. Trust Co. as a role model.
Professional influence comes from the strong identification of employees with
professional groups to which they belong and the behavioral expectations of these
professional groups for their members. The trust department had professional
influences from its legal and financial experts (attorneys and CPA's), who wanted to
preserve credibility with their professional colleagues and often placed professional
norms ahead of business concerns. Reliance on external influence was so pervasive
that it had a role in the departmental mission. Trust department managers saw
compliance with external influences as a primary objective and often used their
compliance record in promotional materials aimed at prospective clients. In other areas
of the marketing mix (product and pricing) trust management also relied on external
influences for direction. Many of the department's services were dictated by regulatory
agencies, as were the department's responsibilities to clients. The services offered
were also influenced by a group of local attorneys, CPA's, and insurance brokers
active in a local professional organization called the Estate Planning Council. Trust
personnel were also members of the Council and the department subsidized Council
functions (e.g., dinners, receptions, etc.) on a regular basis. In return, the department
used Council meetings to informally elicit suggestions and evaluations of their services.
Council meetings were also used informally by coalitions of professionals to request
custom services for their own clients, or as components of their own more
comprehensive packages of services (trust services were bundled with other legal and
financial services).
Pricing was also strongly influenced by the professional community. Attorneys
and CPA's in particular often asked for reduced fees for price sensitive clients, and
some also asked for reduced fees to lower the overall cost of bundled services while
retaining their own customary fees. The department complied because of the
importance of the professional community's approval.
In terms of marketing strategy, our trust department would be best characterized
as a differentiated defender. Please recall defenders set narrow parameters for their
product-market domains, which our trust department did in response to regulatory and
professional constraints. A differentiated defender (as compared to low-cost defenders)
tries to maintain a distinct position in a narrow product market for which it can charge
a small premium. Our trust department differentiated itself by the sophistication of its
estate planning and administrative services and in the breadth of administrative details
trust officers were equipped to handle. By trust industry standards, the department had
almost unmatched expertise in all areas of tax law. It had also assembled a cadre of
experienced trust administrators that were able to respond to the whims of the wealthy
as well as to their legitimate needs. Consequently, the department was singularly
equipped to handle the more difficult estates and clients, and to charge slightly more
for their services.
It retained an institutional theory-in-use, however, because its major sources of
influence continued to be coercive, mimetic, and professional. As mentioned earlier,
the department saw its mission in terms of maintaining external legitimacy with
regulators and the professional community, and by matching the practices and
performance of its nationally renowned role model.
The Deregulated Environment
During the 1970's there was considerable discussion in government circles on
the need for deregulation of the banking industry, largely triggered by the financial and
economic dislocations of the late 60' s and early 70* s. Congressional and administrative
groups worked on alternative plans which led to the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Gairn-St. Germain Act of
1982. Together with complementary changes to state regulations, these two Acts
produced several significant environmental changes for trust departments and banks in
general:
1
.
Interest rate and maturity constraints were eliminated for most bank deposit
instruments.
2. Non-bank institutions were allowed to offer deposit instruments that were
functionally equivalent to savings and checking accounts.
3. Non-bank institutions were allowed to offer credit cards and other forms of
consumer loans.
4. Banks were allowed to offer financial services other than demand deposits and
loans (e.g., discount brokerage services, financial management) on a limited basis.
Concurrent with financial services deregulation and partially related to them,
other changes were implemented by state government and professional associations that
also affected the trust department. Real growth of the U.S. economy declined during
the 1970's, and resource shortages became a reality to many people. Economic decline
had a particularly significant effect on professionals involved with the financial industry
(e.g., attorneys, CPA's etc.) found they were unable to achieve the same level of
success as their predecessors due to increased competition and reduced accumulated
wealth. Their response was lobbying for greater competitive freedom that motivated
additional changes:
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1.
State regulatory agencies allowed insurance companies to combine financial
planning and various investment services with their more traditional products and
sell them as bundled services.
2. State regulatory agencies allowed attorneys and CPA's more latitude in the giving
of financial advice and the selling of financial instruments.
3. The professional standards against competition between attorneys and CPA's were
amended by their respective associations, allowing the commercial advertising and
promotion of legal and financial services to become common place.
All of these changes put great pressure on trust departments. Federal
deregulation allowed savings and loan associations, credit unions, and stock brokerage
firms to offer almost the same array of services as banks in addition to their own
traditional services, which in some instances banks could not match and put banks and
trust departments at a competitive disadvantage. Deregulation forced consumers having
to assimilate an expanded array of investment options and accept increased risk in the
markets. Many clients were overwhelmed by the rate of change and anxiously
demanded explanations, new services, and greater investment sophistication which trust
administrators were not able to provide. Consumers had more financial choices and
could leave more easily when dissatisfied. Many customers left in search of higher
returns and better services, and the loss of revenue affected by both trust and
commercial areas of the bank. Interest rate volatility also affected the trust department
by making client relationships less stable and predictable. Interest rate fluctuations
made it more difficult to invest clients' funds for the long term and highlighted the
department's historical neglect of the financial management area.
In addition, looser standards for insurance underwriters, attorneys, and CPA's
meant they could compete more aggressively and often match the services of trust
departments. This, in effect, turned prior allies into competitors. Trust departments
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that in the past worked in conjunction with these professionals found themselves left out
of new client relationships.
To complicate matters, the entry of new competitors and the changes to
established professional relationships all took place during the century's worst interest
rate crisis. When interest rates were fully deregulated in 1982, the prime rate went to
20% and competitive interest rates on savings investments (what banks paid on
certificates of deposit) went to the 16-17% range. High interest rates put great pressure
on profit margins and endangered already established client relationships. Some long-
time trust clients were rejected on renegotiated loans because they could not meet the
tighter standards imposed by banks to protect their asset positions. Other clients were
offended by the increased reporting requirements and high interest rates the banks
sought to enforce. Both sets of action endangered trust relationships because clients
that could not have their commercial business with the bank would often take their trust
business elsewhere. Reduced bank profits (due to narrower margins) also affected the
trust department by curtailing the subsidy stream from commercial operations.
The changes described above were not trivial. For the fist time in fifty years
the trust department faced aggressive and diverse competition, and its areas of
competitive advantage (legal expertise and administrative breadth) were nullified by
competitive moves and the department's weak financial management area. Also for the
first time, there was an oversupply of financial services providers relative to the
demand in the local market. Customers were no longer restricted by law to do business
with banks or trust departments. In fact, businesses and individual customers could
literally have all their financial needs met without ever setting foot in a bank.
Things were also different in a positive way in terms of the department's ability
to respond to the market. Deregulation eliminated many of the restrictions on what
trust department's could offer, and the change in the scope of services offered by the
professional community eliminated the restrictions those groups had imposed on the
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department as well. The trust department was now legally and professionally able to
seek clients relationships more aggressively and in a larger geographic area, and to
serve the clients without the intervention of other professionals. These changes created
a substantially different environment than the one described in the last section, reduced
the importance of legitimacy, and increased the importance of competition. The new
environment was better characterized by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978).
The Resource Dependence Theory-in-Use
and Its Implications for Marketing Theory
Resource Dependence theory is based on two axioms: interorganizational
competition for limited resources, and the desire of organizations to preserve their
autonomy. As such, the theory is most applicable to environments where there is
competition between organizations for resources (demand exceeds supply) and where
organizations have freedom to pursue alternative strategies to achieve their objectives.
The deregulated environment of the early 80' s moved the trust department into a
resource dependence scenario. The elimination of regulatory boundaries and resulting
influx of new competitors made deposit and loan opportunities (resources) more
susceptible to competition. Competition was also fierce for the trust mainstay services
of financial management and asset administration as stock brokers, CPA's, attorneys,
and insurance underwriters were able to combine similar financial services with their
traditional portfolio. The supply of services and providers exceeded consumer demand.
Deregulation also gave trust departments more autonomy in terms of the products and
services they could offer and how they responded to competitive forces. For our trust
department, they had more opportunities in the services they could offer, in the pricing
of those services, and in their distribution, since the 25 mile radius limit had been
eliminated and trust departments could now market their services throughout the whole
state.
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These environmental changes demanded a shift in strategic style, since they
made the differentiated defender style based on an institutional theory-in-use no longer
viable. The old environment was predictable and relatively stable, even if not fully
controllable, and these are characteristics that are more compatible with defender
strategies (Hambrick 1983). The new environment, in contrast, was neither stable nor
predictable. The same uncertainty about what were suitable strategies plagued existing
and potential competitors, and as a result they were also involved in rapid and
sometimes discontinuous change. In addition, the economic uncertainty of the times
caused considerable uproar among policy makers and produced a quick succession of
tax and interest rate policy changes and reversals almost impossible to predict. The
new environment was more controllable through marketing strategies (Ziethaml and
Ziethaml 1984) but was also more complex.
Strategic styles more suitable for the new environment are those of analyzer or
prospector (Hambrick 1983; McDaniel and Kolari 1987), but this requires a resource
dependence theory-in-use. In contrast with the external orientation of institutional
theory, resource dependence suggests that business units put more emphasis on the
product/market strategy to compete only in domains or market segments in which they
have a sustainable advantage. It also suggests advertising, public relations, and
personal selling should take a more prominent role in differentiating the business to
reduce competition. Finally it suggests the organization establish environmental
scanning and analysis functions to direct its efforts, and that this be done by using
internal resources or by mergers, coalitions, and/or contractual relationships that allow
the business to retain control of the functions. Please note that underlying all these
suggestions is the idea that "the business unit can and should control its environment."
The objective of the firm should be to understand and respond to the environment so as
to compete effectively for scarce resources and preserve the business' autonomy.
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The Transition Process
It seems there should be little disagreement that our trust department needed to
change its strategic style. As mentioned earlier, however, recognizing the need for
change does not necessarily make obvious what needs to change or what direction the
change should take. For the trust department, as for other businesses, the change was
difficult. The institutional theory-in-use prevalent among trust management persisted
long after deregulation was in effect, and resulted in marketing strategies that were ill-
defined and inadequate. The theory-in-use eventually changed to one more
representative of a resource dependence perspective, but the process by which they
changed did not resemble the expectations of classical strategic adaptation (Shortell
1988).
Strategic adaptation theory suggests that organizations facing changing
environments should evaluate the environment and themselves, plan strategies to
respond to the changes, and devote all necessary resources to the implementation of
these strategies. Some strategic actions suggested by this approach are:
1. Identify critical resources (e.g., clients, deposits, financial management talent) and
evaluating them to assess areas of dependence and dominance.
2. Identify important competitors (e.g., stock brokers, attorneys, CPA's, other trust
departments, etc.).
3. Change organizational procedures to reduce dependencies and gain more direct
control of resources (e.g., strategic alliances, develop new services, consolidate
services to improve efficiency).
4. Restructure the organization to shift power to areas critical for survival (e.g.,
reduce emphasis on legal expertise, improve financial management services).
Although by the end of our story in 1989 many of these suggestions had been
implemented, the process was not one of evaluation, planning, and implementation. It
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wasn't even in the spirit of more effective management through analysis suggested by
Wind and Robertson (1983). Instead, it was a slow process of redefining departmental
assumptions about the environment (theories-in-use). The department persisted in
looking externally for direction and legitimacy for several years after deregulation was
implemented, and only slowly came to recognize its increased autonomy and the
increased competition for resources.
At first, the department looked to the government, and there was even hope
between 1980 and 1982 that regulation would be reinstated and "life would return to
normal." As it became clear government would not reimpose external control, trust
management turned to the professional community (attorneys and CPA's) for direction
by instituting collaborative task groups. Although the idea of collaboration fits with
resource dependence theory (establishing strategic coalitions), the department's
objectives were not to limit competition or control the environment. They sought
through these groups to replace the regulatory structure with a professional advisory
one that would intervene and give direction to departmental strategy. These
cooperative groups were supposed to give guidance in terms of product/market and
pricing strategy, and there were even some attempts at getting their input on
promotional efforts also. This approach also failed, however, since many of these
professionals had come to see trust departments as competitors. Some were unwilling
to enter cooperative relationships, while others took advantage of the trust department
and played into the role in order to gain access to established trust clients.
At the same time the trust department looked to the professional community,
they also looked to their past role models (highly regarded trust operations) and sought
the advice of "experts." Virtually overnight, the financial services consulting
profession emerged as trust officers from highly regarded departments began selling
consulting services. Ironically, some of these "experts" had been demoted by their
previous employers (and motivated to leave) because their recommended strategies did
16
not work. The problems of highly regarded trust departments were seldom made
public, however, because these departments also feared the loss of legitimacy. A
number of consultants were hired and dismissed in quick succession, quite often
because "they just don't understand our situation."
During the "consultant" phase the department started making small changes to
its product and pricing policies, although they did not follow a consistent strategy.
Changes were often implemented and rescinded very quickly (some services and
pricing policies only had a 2-3 week life). There was also little coordination and
communication with other areas of the bank, and for a short time the rest of the
organization refused to cooperate with trust department initiatives. By the beginning of
1983 the institutional theory-in-use had been disconfirmed in the mind of many
members of the trust department (external legitimacy was no longer relevant and
external control no longer available), but the scarcity of resources and increased
autonomy had not become firmly established. Service and pricing changes had implied
enhanced autonomy, but the fear of "external punishment" for making the changes
persisted. It took more significant changes to drive home that the market had changed.
As mentioned earlier, deregulation made it possible for clients to leave the
department for better quality services from non-bank providers, and the interest rate
crisis had endangered other relationships and the subsidy of the trust department by
commercial operations. The end result was the department's first loss of assets under
management (a measure of trust business activity) in over 30 years, and an accounting
adjustment that repositioned the trust department as a money losing business unit.
The net effect was to publicly expose the department as financial responsible
and deficient in its protection of its market, and indirectly accentuate the department
now had a wider array of competitors and more freedom to respond. In a matter of
months the resource dependence theory-in-use became the dominant one in the
department, and the marketing strategy of the business started being shaped by it. The
17
first step was a more organized market research program than what had been used in
the past. Existing and potential customers were surveyed on service and pricing
policies for the first time. Cooperative arrangements were formed with other areas of
the bank, and cross-training on trust and commercial products was established.
Personal selling became more important, and even the recruiting and reward practices
(commission compensation) were changed to attract and retain qualified personnel.
Advertising strategy was also affected but trust research findings and resulted in a
comprehensive advertising campaign for all bank products.
By 1985 the department had transitioned from a differentiated defender to an
analyzer strategic style focused on protecting its established customer base and
competitive advantage, and looking for new opportunities in areas like income tax
services and small account financial management. They also established dominant
cooperative agreements with several trust departments throughout the state. In 1986
the bank was acquired by a bank holding company, but in a reversal of past practices
by the acquiring company, the trust department as allowed to remain autonomous, and
eventually formed dominant coalitions with other trust departments within the same
holding company.
It must be noted, however, the transition to the resource dependence theory-in-
use was not smooth or uniform. In practice, the rate of change gained momentum
when enough managers had made the transition to upset the balance of power in the
department. A number of other managers continued to hold the institutional theory-in-
use and as late as 1989 were resisting the changes to the department's marketing
strategy. They saw it as illegal and a mistake in spite of its successful track record and
looked outside the organization for direction and legitimacy.
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Changing Theories-in-Use
The persistence of the old theories-in-use in the new environment should not
surprise us given how difficult it is to change our knowledge structures. There are
multiple conceptual treatments of knowledge structures (e.g., scripts (Abelson 1981),
distilled ideologies (Salancik & Porac 1986), ideologies (Beyer 1981)), but most agree
that people apply them to make sense of their environments and to inform their
behavior. They also agree these knowledge structures are based on past experience, are
relatively stable, and change slowly as new experiences update them. Theories-in-use
are a type of experienced knowledge structures and as difficult to change as other
structures. This explains, at least partially, the slow rate at which trust department
management changed its theories-in-use. The connection between knowledge structures
and theories-in-use also suggests that understanding how knowledge structures are
formed and updated will help us better grasp (and possibly improve) how businesses
transition between strategic styles.
A parsimonious and intuitively appealing treatment of knowledge structures
applied to organziations is found in the idea of enactment (Weick 1979).
insert figure 1 here
Figure 1 illustrates the process of sense making through enactment. The theory
suggests the environment is ambiguous and we make sense of it by enacting (acting on)
an interpretation, evaluating the outcome of our enactment using selected aspects or
variables, and retaining the outcome for future enactment and selection opportunities.
Retentions are evoked when new situations are encountered, and they inform both the
behavior of the individual (enactment) and the perception of the environment's reaction
to that behavior (selection). Retained knowledge structures determine what variables
are considered important in both the environment and the individual or organizational
19
response. In other words, we act and evaluate the outcome based on what we expected
from our environment (e.g., Nisbett and Ross 1980, Taylor 1989). Weick treats
retentions as knowledge structures not much different from theories-in-use.
In Figure 1, enactment and environment are linked in what is called a deviation
amplifying loop (environmental change produces enactment which in turn results in
supporting environmental change). Enactment is also connected to selection, indicating
that the volume and direction of enactment has a direct bearing on selection activity.
Likewise, selection has a direct effect on retention. Of particular interest to us is the
effect of retention on both selection and enactment, which in Figure 1 is shown as
being either amplifying (+) or reducing (-). An amplifying effect (+) indicates the
person decides to trust past experience. A reducing effect (-) means past experience is
ignored. In stable environments, deviation amplifying loops (+) are not a problem,
since they steer behavior in a consistent direction in spite of small variations in the
environment, and this steady behavior preserves a sense of progress. In unstable
environments, however, deviation amplifying loops are problematic if the decision
maker's actions are incompatible with environmental conditions. Ideally, we should
expect that in changing environments individuals will choose to ignore past experience
and introduce deviation reducing behavior into the loop. Weick correctly argues,
however, such changes are not easy to make because people are strongly predisposed to
trust past experience and only slowly are they convinced to discard old retentions in
favor of new ones. The process by which retentions are changed seems to be a slow
deconstruction of retentions into simpler elements that are altered based on experience
and then reconstituted into new retentions. Changing the sign of the feedback loop
going from retention to both enactment and selection is consequently gradual and
possibly not all done in conscious processing.
The relevance of sense making through enactment to changing theories-in-use is
relatively straightforward. The failure to make what appear to be sensible adjustments
20
to marketing strategy and the persistence of old habits is caused by the slow process by
which retentions are changed in the individual (in this case trust department
management). They could not move any faster because they were unable to see the
changed environment had made new strategic factors important (their selection was
biased by retention) while their behavior continued to be determined by the old
important factors (enactment was also biased by retention). They certainly could not
see what actions and perspectives would take them from a defender to an analyzer
strategic style. If the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of retentions hold
for theories-in-use that inform strategic management, it seems reasonable we should see
several tell-tale behaviors by marketing managers:
1
.
Management will believe they understand the situation after minimal scrutiny and
will repeatedly underestimate the amount of change required. Strategies will be
based on what they can perceive and understand of the environment (which is
restricted by retentions), and they will often propose solutions that do not go far
enough. The strategic adaptation model, in contrast, suggests initial analysis
that will disconfirm all existing theories-in-use and lead to a more accurate
assessment of changes required.
2. Behavioral changes will lag environmental changes because it takes time for
management to enact and select factors applicable to the new environment. In
strategic adaptation managers will learn quickly to anticipate environmental
change and lag will be minimal or non-existent.
3. Strategies will tend to be of limited scope and will be implemented and discarded
in quick succession because as elements of retentions are discontinued strategic
moves will become inadequate. This is an iterative process similar to the
"experimental adaptation" observed by Wind and Robertson (1983) but not
supported by the evaluation, planning, and implementation model.
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4. Language (words and their meanings) that in the past was commonly accepted will
become a source of confusion as individual manager retentions change at
different rates and in different directions. This is a time when commonly
accepted meanings (organizational memory) are discredited but their substitutes
have not been formulated. The strategic adaptation model suggests any
disagreements over meaning are resolved in the evaluation stage.
Many of these expected behaviors were evident in the transition of the trust
department from defender to analyzer as described above. For example:
1. Solutions that did not go far enough and management's false sense of
understanding are evident in the department's multiple initiatives. First they
attempted to reinstate regulation and drive competitors out of the market and to
form cooperative alliances with professional groups that were now competitors,
and then hired and fired a number of consultants in quick succession. Through
these initiatives the department's managers were enacting and selecting on
retentions no longer relevant to the environment and that were being
disconfirmed and updated by their experiences, but the process was slow.
2. The lag between environmental change and organizational response is evident in
the timing of change. It took over a year after deregulation was effective
(1980-1981) before the first changes were made to product and pricing
practices, although they knew about the regulatory changes two years before
they became official. (Preliminary information on changes was available in
1978). Knowing about the changes was not enough because they had not
experienced the new environment, and it took repeated experiences for old
retentions to start changing.
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3. The iterative nature of strategy development is evident in the department's product
and pricing strategy. New product ideas in response to deregulation did not
start being considered until 18 months after deregulation, and then they were
often introduced and eliminated in quick succession. The department was not
really learning if new product offerings were market worthy because they
seldom kept products long enough to test market response adequately. What
they were doing was changing their retentions about competition and autonomy.
4. Confusion caused by language losing its common meaning is illustrated by a part
of the story not mentioned until now - the struggle over the role of trust
administrators. As mentioned before, trust administrators had served as estate
planners and managers in the regulated environment, and were required to have
considerable knowledge of tax law, with investment strategies having secondary
importance. Deregulation made old roles obsolete, but what the correct new
roles should be took a long time to be established. Some managers wanted to
turn trust administrators into modern financial counselors, while others wanted
to position them as providers of highly personalized administrative services
(personal secretaries). This led to considerable confusion over adequate levels
of training for administrators. From 1983 to 1985, funds were spent on training
which was later made obsolete by the on-going redefining of the roles. As late
as 1989 this was a continuing debate, although the personal administrative role
was the dominant ideology.
By the 1985-86 there had been a sufficient number of strategic iterations that the
retentions of the majority of trust department managers had been updated to more
closely match a resource dependence theory-in-use, and as described earlier, marketing
strategies had come to resemble those of an analyzer strategic style. Our trust
department was lucky in how quickly it adapted, and that it was somewhat shielded
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from competitive forces by the overall negative image of its geographic market.
(Unemployment and economic hardship stories about this market had been nationally
circulated and resulted in major financial service providers ignoring it.) It had enough
time to learn and adjust its strategic style while remaining financially solvent. Many
other trust departments in the state were not so fortunate and went out of business
during the same period, either because they never were able to change their theories-in-
use, or because they ran out of time. Departments adopting a low-cost defender style
were particularly susceptible since deregulation allowed competitors with more efficient
systems to enter the market and nullify the department's competitive advantage
virtually overnight. The legal expertise and administrative breadth advantages were
harder to duplicate by new comers.
The transitions for the trust department, however, might not be over, as the
continuing changes in the financial services industry put more pressure on the banking
and trust industry as a whole. The improvements in transaction efficiencies in financial
markets caused by telecommunications and computer technology breakthroughs (Behm
1992) are reducing the need for bank and trust intermediaries unless they can facilitate
transactions more efficiently than other options. Focusing on efficiency of transactions
suggests that elements of Transactions Cost Theory (Williamson 1981) might have to be
incorporated into current theories-in-use to produce marketing strategies compatible
with the financial services environment into the 21st century, and it will be those
organziations that transition most quickly that will survive.
Discussion
Although we cannot claim our case study is characteristic of how all business
units update retentions, we have learned some valuable lessons from this analysis. First
we find that although the distinction between individual managers and the business is
useful in academic treatment of strategic marketing issues, we cannot lose sight of their
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interdependency. Organizations rely on individuals to make sense of the environment,
develop strategies, and make decisions, and are consequently affected by the
psychological constraints of people (Daft and Weick 1984). It is true that businesses
seem to develop memories of their own, since they preserve theories-in-use beyond the
tenure of any one individual, but those theories-in-use still reside in the minds of
members and can only change as the retentions of members change.
Second we observe the process of change is not fully understood, nor does it
seem to be fully under conscious control. Weick (1979) defined retentions in
somewhat nebulous terms - as a combination of cognition, affect, and behavioral
tendencies that interact in hard-to-predict ways - as if to emphasize the process is not
well understood or controlled. To understand how marketers and their organizations
transition between strategic styles it is not enough to track their cognitive calculus
(Axelrod 1976). We need to understand the roles of knowledge, emotion, and other
behavior-defining forces (personality, commitment, self-image). We also need to
understand the more basic elements of theories-in-use that are disconfirmed and
updated in the transition process.
Finally, we are made aware of our need to understand why theories-in-use are
primarily disconfirmed by evaluating the outcome of our own behavior instead of from
knowledge gained vicariously and how to replicate enactment processes in controlled
settings. Experience is a great teacher, but it can also be very costly to the
organization and society at large. In the case of trust departments, our story had a
happy ending since the department changed styles successfully and is today a profitable
business. The same cannot be said for many other trust departments across the country
that went out of business because they were too slow to learn and adapt to the new
environment. The case suggests that if we can find ways of enhancing the experience
level of marketing managers in controlled settings, it might be possible to accelerate the
updating of theories-in-use while reducing the cost of experimentation. This requires
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cognitive and emotional experiences, however, beyond the reach of even the best role
playing and case analysis exercises.
This discussion is limited by its focus on one organization and one industry, and
by its retrospective interpretation of the historical record. It provides only anecdotal
support for the enactment model as a mechanism for updating theories-in-use and its
generalizability is questionable. It is compelling, nevertheless, because the detail at
which the department's behaviors are observed make other explanations of the
transition process somewhat less palatable. At a minimum, it motivates us to study the
transition process more rigorously. To test the applicability of the enactment process
more rigorously it is necessary to use an experimental approach in which environments
are changed and the transition process is recorded. Concurrent verbal protocols are one
possible methodology suitable to assess how marketing managers change their strategic
style.
To test the applicability of the process to other industries it is necessary to select
one or more businesses that are currently experiencing changes in their environments,
make an assessment of their current theories-in-use, and then track their transition
process. The Pentagon and defense industry might be a fruitful area to explore in the
wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the subsequent
demilitarization of Western nations. The active rhetoric by Pentagon officials and
defense industry personnel on the need for military readiness against what are now
"unexpected" threats suggests, however, that theories-in-use are not changing very
quickly.
Conclusion
This paper suggests that beyond recognizing different strategic styles and their
characteristics, we need to understand the process by which businesses transition
between strategic styles in response to environmental changes. It illustrates that
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changing strategic styles and resulting marketing strategies is not attainable by simply
demanding change, and that there might be factors other than poor managerial training
to explain why businesses struggle with transitions. The paper suggest strategic
marketing style is a function of theories-in-use that are deeply ingrained in the minds of
marketing managers, and they change only as experience disconfirms old theories in
favor of new ones. The process of change is iterative and to some degree
unpredictable.
We benefit from considering the process of transition as well as the
characteristics of strategic styles in two ways. First, it forces us to consider a set of
variables that has not received as much attention in marketing as environmental
characteristics and strategic planning models but might be just as important. The
nature of retentions and their more basic elements is as promising an area of inquiry in
marketing as it has been in strategic management. The role of experience in
determining enactment, and in particular the interaction of cognition, emotion, and
behavioral tendencies, is another promising area. We have known intuitively for some
time that marketers' actions often involve more than cognition, and the time might have
arrived for more rigorous research in this area.
Second, the field will benefit by encompassing the processes within the
individual manager as well as the organization into more comprehensive models of
strategic thinking. We know much about the characteristics and behaviors of markets
and businesses within markets, but the predictive ability of our theories is sometimes
hampered by the actions of individual managers. Incorporating the characteristics and
behaviors of individuals into more comprehensive models of strategic marketing is
likely to improve their predictive ability.
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TABLE 1
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS
Time Environmental
Change
1980 Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act
Interest Rate and Maturity
Constraints Reduced
Savings and Loan and Credit
Umon Services Expanded
Restrictions on Financial
Services by Bank and Trust
Providers Reduced
Managerial
Implications
Spectrum of Competitors
Expanded
Pressure on Profits
as Margins Narrow
Pressure on Bank
Services and Revenue
Spectrum of Services
Trust Departments Can
Offer is Expanded
1981 Federal Reserve Tightens
Monetary Policy - Interest
Rates go to 20%.
State Regulatory Agencies
Reduce Restrictions on:
- Insurance Providers
- Banks and S&L
- Geographic Coverage
Professional Associations
Reduce Restrictions on:
- Attorneys Marketing
- CPA's Marketing
Bank Credit Policies
Become Tighter - Lending
Under Pressure
Trust Investments Less
Attractive than Regular
Savings Products
Geographic Expansion
Opportunities
Attorneys, CPA's, and
Insurance Brokers
Threaten Estate Planning
and Administrative. Advantage
1982 Gairn-St. Germain Act
Interest Rate and Maturity
Constraints Eliminated
Government Re-regulation
of Industry Made Unlikely
Opportunities and Threats
of Price Error Increased
Consumer Credit Allowed
by Non-Bank Providers
Array of Financial Mgmt.
Products from Trust
Departments Expanded
Subsidy Stream from
Bank Threatened
Opportunities for Offering
Sophisticated Financial
Management Products
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